In this article, we show plausible situations where the net present value (NPV) criterion leads to inefficient capital budgeting outcomes and is dominated by other capital budgeting criteria, like the internal rate of return (IRR) and the profitability index (PI). Our theory is rooted in the mainstream paradigm of corporate finance: firms use NPV to measure the addition to firm value from prospective projects, but because of "classical" informational and agency considerations, NPV is not the capital budgeting criterion that implements the best possible outcome. We show that the IRR and PI are useful in curbing empire-building managers because, when selecting between mutually exclusive projects, they tend to bias against large-scale projects. We also identify the conditions under which direct monitoring through capital budgeting is more efficient than compensation contracts in alleviating the agency problem, and the conditions under which compensation contracts are more efficient.
Introduction
In this article, we show that in plausible scenarios, the net present value (NPV) criterion leads to inefficient capital budgeting outcomes and that it is dominated by other capital budgeting criteria, like the internal rate of return (IRR) and the profitability index (PI). Our theory is not based on concepts that are new to financial economics, or on any unusual assumption. On the contrary, it is rooted in the mainstream paradigm of corporate finance: firms use NPV to measure the addition to firm value from prospective projects, but because of "classical" informational and agency considerations, NPV is not the capital budgeting criterion that implements the best possible outcome. In fact, in many cases it implements strikingly inferior outcomes.
We consider firms that consist of top management, headquarters, and divisional mangers, the manager. 1 The objective of headquarters is the "appropriate" one, to maximize shareholders' value. In contrast, divisional managers maximize their own utilities, and, therefore, their incentives are not aligned with shareholders' value maximization. To alleviate the adverse impact of these conflicting incentives, headquarters needs to design monitoring and incentive mechanisms. To this end, headquarters sets up a capital allocation system that specifies a capital budgeting criterion, a wage compensation for divisional managers, and the identity of who makes the final acceptance decision of projects, divisional managers or headquarters.
The difference between our approach and the "textbook" approach to capital budgeting is best demonstrated with a simple example. Suppose headquarters can observe all projects that are available to the firm at no cost. Then, headquarters will maximize firm value by selecting projects according to the "textbook" NPV rule. 2 If, however, headquarters does not have access to the information possessed by divisional managers regarding available projects, the capital budgeting criterion the firm uses may affect the set of projects that the manager will choose to bring for headquarters approval.
To see this in action, suppose that the set of potential projects includes two mutually exclusive projects. The projects arrive randomly and independently, so either one of them, both, or neither will become available. Suppose the manager prefers a project that requires a larger investment, although this project has a lower NPV. In this case, if both projects become available, and if headquarters uses the "textbook" NPV rule as its capital budgeting criterion, the manager will exercise her discretion and "hide" the better project. She will do so by including only the project with the low NPV in the capital budgeting request she submits to headquarters. This managerial discretion of lower ranked officers implies that managers will manipulate the capital budgeting process according to their own preferences. As a result, the set of projects headquarters will get to consider will be very different from the set of projects that actually becomes available to the firm.
The NPV rule does a poor job in restricting manipulations by divisional managers who privately observe the availability of mutually exclusive projects. Depending on the nature of the underlying distribution of cash flow and the specifics of the agency problem between managers and headquarters, a different capital budgeting criterion may be needed to implement the selection of the high NPV project. Therefore, while it is indisputable that NPV is the best way to measure value added, in many situations it is not a good way to implement the selection of the highest NPV projects.
The above example demonstrates a fundamental deficiency of the NPV criterion in implementing the best project selection. If NPV does not implement the selection of projects with the highest NPV, what mechanism does? To characterize the best projects selection mechanism, it is necessary to analyze the broader issue of capital allocation in organizations. A capital allocation system consists of two main aspects, namely, a wage compensation that provides managers incentives to select better projects, and a capital budgeting process that imposes direct restrictions on managerial discretion. In general, the rules governing NPV, and 2. Mutually Exclusive Projects: Accept the project with the highest NPV, as long as the NPV is positive.
the capital budgeting process may be very complex. For example, these rules may depend on economy-wide state variables, project-specific state variables, and may have many restrictions and detailed guidance.
Therefore, we differentiate between complex capital budgeting rules, that may be state dependent and vary from project to project, and simple capital budgeting criteria, like the NPV, IRR, and PI criteria, that are state independent, and apply equally to all projects on a risk-adjusted basis. In this article we focus on simple capital budgeting criteria, and identify economic environments where they are optimal.
We characterize the optimal capital allocation system by solving a general mechanism design problem for the optimal capital budgeting rule and managerial compensation. The following three capital allocation systems emerge as the solution to the general mechanism design problem:
Centralized capital budgeting system: headquarters determines capital budgeting rules, according to which the acceptance decision of projects is made. Divisional managers submit capital budgeting requests to headquarters, who in turn makes the acceptance decision based on the capital budgeting rules in place.
Performance-based compensation system: headquarters offers performance-based compensation to divisional managers and delegates the project selection decision to them.
Decentralized capital budgeting system: headquarters delegates the project selection decision to divisional managers, and does not pay them performance-based compensations.
In a centralized capital allocation system, headquarters determines the rules of the capital budgeting process, reviews capital budgeting requests that the manager submits, and make the acceptance decision. In a performance-based system, headquarters delegates project choice to the manager and affects incentives only through performance-based managerial compensation. In a decentralized system headquarters delegates project choice to divisional managers and does not affect managerial incentives at all.
Having solved the general problem, we show that in various realistic scenarios, some of the wellknown and widely used capital budgeting criteria implement efficient outcomes.
In particular, we demonstrate that the profitability index (PI) and the internal rate of return (IRR) criteria implement the best outcome in cases where the firm may choose between a number of technologies with uncertain investment and profit scales. The scale uncertainty enables a privately informed manager with preferences for largescale projects to "justify" a large investment by claiming that the realized scale of the proposed venture is large. The PI and the IRR criteria prevent this manipulation, because, being ratios, they are "scale neutral,"
forcing the manager to request the more profitable technology.
We would like to emphasize that given the complexity of the capital budgeting process, it is surprising that in many situations, simple capital budgeting criteria can perform as well as more detailed and complex rules. We expect, however, that in other realistic situations, complex capital budgeting rules, that include more guidance and instructions, can better restrict manipulations by managers. Nevertheless, even in these situations, simple criteria may have certain advantages in terms of communication and clarity. Thus, they may have a distinct role even in a more complex environment.
3
Our theory provides a possible explanation for the surprising evidence that most corporations do not rely on the NPV rule in their capital budgeting practices, and they use the above mentioned "inferior" competing capital budgeting criteria. For example, Stanley and Block (1984) report for a survey of 121 multinational firms, that "The internal rate of return clearly dominates as the primary method with a 65.3 percent representation. The net present value approach, often preferred over other methods in published materials on the subject, was specified as the primary method in only 16.5 percent of the responses. The payback method was selected as the primary method in only 5 percent of the cases, but was the most important secondary approach in 37.6 percent of the responses." Moreover, they add: "It is interesting to note that the net present value is used less than 50 percent of the times as either a primary or secondary
Another important implication of our theory is that, even if firms use one or more of the known capital budgeting criteria, they are unlikely to use them in their "textbook" forms, but will use modified versions. For example, firms will use a modified IRR rule where the hurdle rate is different than the risk-adjusted cost of capital. Thus, our theory can explain the puzzling finding in Poterba and Summers (1995) that U.S. firms use real hurdle rates that are considerably higher than a standard cost-of-capital analysis would suggest. 5 Similarly, to the extent that multinational firms investing abroad confront more severe implementation problems, our theory provides a possible rationale for the often criticized practice of adding a fudge factor to the cost of capital used by these firms. Harris and Raviv (1996) provide a theory of endogenous capital rationing as a way to curb informed managers with a tendency to build empires, while yet benefiting from their private information. Harris and Raviv (1998) consider two independent investment projects and characterize the situations where it is optimal for headquarters to delegate to the manager the allocation of a total budget for the two projects. 6 In both articles the NPV rule does not implement the first-best outcome because headquarters know the NPV only if they pay verification costs. Without verification costs the NPV criterion would implement the firstbest outcome in these models. By contrast, in our model the NPV rule does not implement the best outcome even when headquarters learns the NPV of requested projects at no cost. Narayanan (1985) considers a model where managers prefer projects with early cash flows to enhance their reputation and, thus, select projects according to the payback method. Thakor (1990) provides a rationale for capital rationing in an environment where the firm is cash constrained and, therefore, prefers short-term projects in which the cash flow is realized sooner. This preference towards short-term projects may be implemented, for example, by the payback method. In contrast to these models, in our model there is no cash constraints, and the capital allocation system is used to restrict managerial discretion. Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) show, in a setting similar to ours, how compensation contracts are used to induce self-serving managers to take high value, high-risk projects. We endogenously solve for the optimal method, wage compensation or capital budgeting, to alleviate the agency conflicts.
5 Specifically, Poterba and Summers (1995) found that, during the past half-century, the average real discount rate was 12.2%, distinctly higher than equity holders' average rates of return of approximately 7 % and much higher than the return on debt of approximately 2%. We should note that these findings are also consistent with an optimal decision of firms that face the real option of waiting to invest in irreversible investments. 6 In previous work, Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv (1982) show how transfer pricing is used in allocating funds
In Stein (1997) , a firm faces an exogenous capital constraint and its informed headquarters allocates the limited resources to the better project ("winner picking") at the expense of the other project ("losersticking"). Trading off headquarters' monitoring ability against the efficient allocation of resources, Stein explains optimal scale and scope for firms. In our model, headquarters does not face capital rationing, but can be manipulated by better-informed, lower ranked managers.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide two simple examples to demonstrate our idea. Section 3 provides the basic structure of the capital allocation process, and characterizes the optimal capital allocation system. In Sections 4 we discuss the effectiveness of well-known capital budgeting criteria and show how the IRR and the PI criteria implement the optimal capital allocation system and how the NPV criterion fails to do so. In Section 5 we present the empirical predictions of our theory, and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Illustrative examples of the main idea
In this section we provide a couple of simple examples that will help to develop the intuition for why the NPV criterion is an inefficient method for implementing a capital budgeting process that maximizes shareholders value in the presence of incentive problems. For each of these examples, we offer an alternative capital budgeting criterion that does better than the NPV criterion. We explore the features of this capital budgeting criterion that make it a superior method in solving that example. Note that we focus on familiar capital budgeting criteria that dominate the NPV criterion and that these criteria are not necessarily unique or optimal in implementing the best outcome. We defer the derivation of optimality conditions and the analysis of wage compensation to Section 4, where we present a more general model, in which alternative capital budgeting criteria like the IRR or PI are optimal.
Throughout the examples, there are two agents: headquarters, which sets the capital budgeting rules in order to maximize shareholders value, and a self-interested manager, who maximizes her own utility. The within the firm in the presence of information and incentive problems.
examples differ in the type of agency problems as dictated by the manager's preferences, and consequently the capital budgeting criteria that headquarters will choose to use to alleviate the incentive problem.
Large investments and imperialistic managers -the role of PI and IRR ratios
It is well known from standard finance textbooks that capital budgeting criteria that are based on benefit-cost ratios, like IRR or PI, tend to be biased against large-scale projects. As a result, firms using such criteria bear the risk of rejecting a more capital-intensive project with a higher NPV and accepting a less capital-intensive project with a lower NPV. In the following example we show how headquarters can use the inherent bias of benefit-cost ratios against large-scale investments to curb imperialistic managers with a preference towards large-scale projects. We demonstrate our point in two steps. First we show that when the project scales are known and certain, various capital budgeting criteria can implement the optimal outcome, but the NPV criterion cannot. Second, we show that, when there is uncertainty about project scales, simple benefit-cost ratio criteria like IRR and PI dominate other simple non-benefit-cost criteria like NPV and capital rationing.
Consider a manager with preferences toward large-scale projects, who runs a firm with two potential mutually exclusive projects. The small-scale project, project S, requires a $10,000 initial investment on date zero, and yields $11,500 on date one. The large-scale project, project B, requires a $20,000 initial investment on date zero, and yields $22,000 on date one. Suppose that the appropriate discount rate for both projects is 8%. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the two projects and provides their NPV, PI, and IRR 7 . The profitability index is defined by the present value of future cash flow divided by the initial investment:
Project B is always available to the firm, but project S is only available with probability 1 > q > 0.
The manager is better informed than headquarters in that she knows whether project S is available, while headquarters does not know. Therefore, headquarters has to rely on the information the manager chooses to share with it. It is this information asymmetry that gives the manager the ability to manipulate the investment decision of the firm. capital of $10,000. Since only the manager knows which project is available, she will hide project S in the eventuality that both projects B and S are available. Thus, headquarters designs a capital budgeting process to alleviate this agency problem.
It is easy to see how the textbook NPV rule -accept the project with the highest NPV as long as it is positive -results in project selection that does not maximize shareholders value. Under the NPV rule, when both projects become available, the manager will hide project S and will seek financing for project B. Since project B has a positive NPV, headquarters will approve it, resulting in a loss of NPV S -NPV B = $277.7 in shareholders' value.
In this simplified example there are other criteria that can force the manager to reveal the availability of both projects. First, a modified NPV rule with a higher hurdle can be used as follows. Headquarters announces that it accepts projects with NPV above the cutoff level of NPV c = $500, and rejects projects with NPV below it. 8 With this rule in place, only project S can be approved. The benefit of this rule is that when both projects are available, the manager will not hide project S, because she cannot get financing for project PI = (NPV + I)/I B. The cost of this rule is that when only project B is available, it will be rejected, despite its positive NPV.
When the agency problem is important, that is, when q is high enough, using this modified NPV rule increases firm value. Other modified rules can implement the same outcome as the modified NPV rule. For example, if headquarters announces it accepts projects with PI above the cutoff level of PI c = 1.04, and rejects projects with PI below it, the manager will be forced to reveal the availability of project S when both projects are available. 9 The same outcome can be implemented if headquarters sets a hurdle rate (or a cutoff IRR) of IRR c = 13%, such that projects with higher IRR are accepted and lower IRR are rejected. 10 Another possible solution is to use capital limits. In this example, if headquarters sets a capital limit of $15,000, only project S will be financed.
11
To see how benefit-cost ratio criteria like PI and IRR dominate level criteria, we now introduce uncertainty about projects' scale on top of the uncertainty about the availability of projects. Specifically, we assume that the firm faces uncertainty regarding the residual demand for the proposed venture's final product. The firm's production function is such that a larger demand for the venture's final product results in a proportional increase in the scale of operation, as measured by the initial investment I, the resulting expected cash flow CF 1 , and thus the project NPV. This scale uncertainty is represented by a random variable α∈ℜ + . It follows that the investment level of projects B and S are $10,000α and $20,000α, and their NPVs are $370.4α and $648.1α, respectively. We assume that the realization of α is private information of the manager and, therefore, the capital budgeting rule cannot be directly conditioned on α.
12
The difference between benefit-cost ratio criteria like PI and IRR, and other level criteria like NPV and capital rationing is that ratio criteria are constant with respect to α, while level criteria are monotonically increasing with α. Specifically, the PI ratios of projects B and S remain 1.02 and 1.06, respectively, for 8 Any cutoff level between NPV B = $370.4 and NPV S = $648.1 implements the same outcome. 9 Any cutoff level between PI B = $1.02 and PI S = 1.06 implements the same outcome. 10 Any cutoff level of IRR between IRR B = 10% and IRR S = 15% implements the same outcome. 11 Any capital limit between I S = $10,000 and I B = $20,000 implements the same outcome. 12 Note that the previous example without scale uncertainty corresponds to the case of a known α = 1.
every realization of α. Figure 2 shows how the cutoff level of PI c = 1.04 that was used in the example with a known α = 1, results in the acceptance of projects S and the rejection of project B for any realization of α.
As a result, the manager is forced to reveal the availability of project S when both projects are available, regardless of the realization of α. Similarly, Figure 3 shows how the hurdle rate of IRR c = 13% that was used in the example with a known α = 1, results in the acceptance of projects S and the rejection of project B for any realization of α. Again, this forces the manager to reveal the availability of project S when both projects are available, regardless of the realization of α. For lower values of α, the manager can pass both projects and, thus, will hide project S. For higher values of α both projects will require too much capital and, thus, will be rejected.
Managerial preference towards long-term projects -the role of payback period
A common criticism against the use of the payback period criterion to select projects is that it ignores long-term cash flow that is due beyond a pre-determined cutoff period. The example below shows that the inherent bias of the payback period criterion against long-term projects can be used to curb managers with a preference for such projects. 13 Recall from the first part of the example that it is optimal to force the manager to reveal the availability of project S when both projects are available only if the benefit of doing so exceeds the cost from rejecting There are several reasons why managers may have preferences for long-term projects. Managers may be averse to resolution of uncertainty that reveals new information about their ability to manage the project, or about the profitability of the project they have chosen. This is likely to be the case if the manager is risk averse, or if she is concerned about the security of her job. To the extent that early cash flow from a project reveals information about the manager's ability and/or future profitability of the project, managers with such preferences will tend to prefer projects with late cash flow to those with early cash flow. Another possible reason for managers to prefer long-term projects is that they derive periodical private benefits from running the projects as long as they operate. For simplicity, we assume that managerial preferences for longterm projects are represented by fixed per-period non-contractible private perquisites, P, the manager obtains each period the project operates.
Consider a firm that potentially has two mutually exclusive projects. The appropriate cost of capital for both projects is 8%. Table 2 provides the cash flow profile of the long-term project, project LT, and the short-term project, project ST. Suppose that project LT is always available, while project ST, the more valuable project, is available only with probability 0 < q < 1. Only the manager can observe whether project ST is available. Since the manager prefers project LT, where she gets private benefits of 3P, she will hide the availability of project ST, where she gets private benefits of 2P, whenever she can make headquarters accept project LT. If headquarters uses the NPV rule, the manager requests project LT and headquarters accepts it. Therefore, the project L when only project L is available. We defer the derivation of optimality conditions to Section 4.
NPV rule implements an inferior outcome. If, instead, headquarters used a payback rule with a cutoff of 2 periods, the manager is forced to reveal project ST, because she cannot get project LT approved. Note that, as in the previous example, a modified NPV rule, that sets the cutoff NPV level, NPV c , between $48,605.4
and $50,857.3, will force the manager to reveal project ST. However, if there is uncertainty about the residual demand for the firm's product, as in the previous example, the modified NPV criterion will be inferior to the payback criterion, because the payback period is scale independent, while the NPV monotonically increases with the level of the scale parameter. 
A model of the capital allocation process
Consider a firm consisting of top management -headquarters, and divisional managers -the manager. The objective of headquarters is to maximize shareholders value, and the manager maximizes her own utility. Headquarters sets up a capital allocation system that includes both the rules of the capital budgeting process and the compensation for divisional managers. To abstract away from exogenous capital rationing issues, we assume that headquarters faces no liquidity constraints.
The main idea of the paper can be demonstrated by considering an investment opportunity set consisting of one business venture that is implemented by two mutually exclusive projects. The only difference between the two projects is the required capital necessary to operate the underlying technologies.
One project is more capital-intensive, and is denoted "Project H". The other is less capital intensive, and is denoted "Project L". The actual levels of investment and cash flow of each project depend also on a scale parameter α, representing the level of demand for the final product of the firm. Specifically, the required investment for project m = L, H is
, where k I (α) is an increasing function of the scale parameter α, and I L and I H are scalars that represent the technology being used. We assume that I H > I L , 14 In general, the IRR is also biased against long-term projects, and can be used by headquarters to discipline managers with preferences for long term projects. In our example, however, the IRR does not work, because there is also a size differential between the projects. Since the IRR is also biased against large scale projects, and project ST is larger, the IRR is biased against it. This effect dominates the other effect here, and, therefore, the IRR fails in this example. reflecting the assumption that H is more capital intensive than L. This assumption implies that I H (α) > I L (α).
Regardless of the underlying technology being used, the future expected cash flow that the venture is expected to generate in period t is identical for both technologies and given by
, where, as before, k c (α) is an increasing function of the scale parameter α, and c t are scalars. 15 The appropriate discount rate is ρ, independent of the underlying technology. Therefore, the NPV of a type m = L, H project is given
There are two sources of uncertainty regarding the projects. The first is uncertainty about which project is available. While the characteristics of each project are known, there is uncertainty about which combination of the two projects is actually available to the firm. The arrival of projects L and H follows a binomial process with independent probabilities of arrival g L and g H , respectively.
The second source of uncertainty is the scale parameter α, which represents the residual demand for the venture's final product. We incorporate this uncertainty by assuming that α is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function F(α), whose density function is f(α). The manager observes α before she seeks financing, but headquarters cannot observe α, and needs to infer it from the manager's capital request.
The manager's utility is defined over her wage income, W, and firm size as measured by the required investment, I, and is given by the following utility function:
We assume that the manager's utility increases with her wage compensation,
, where subscripts denote partial derivative, and that her utility is zero when the wage is zero, that is, u(0) = 0. Moreover, ψ is a positive scalar, implying that the manager draws benefit from larger-scale investment projects. For tractability, we assume that the manager has no personal wealth, and her reservation utility is zero. 16 The assumption that the manager has no personal wealth implies that W ≥ 0.
The sequence of events and information structure of the capital allocation game is described in Figure 5 . It consists of three stages. In stage 1, headquarters establishes a capital allocation system that includes the rules of the capital budgeting process and managerial compensation. In stage 2, the divisional manager privately observes the realized state of nature and decides which projects to include in the capital budgeting request that she submits to headquarters. A capital budgeting request specifies the required investment and the future expected cash flow for each requested project. In stage 3 headquarters evaluates the capital budgeting request, makes acceptance decisions based on the capital budgeting rule it established in stage 1, and pays the manager according to the compensation contract. We assume that headquarters can perfectly identify the characteristics of projects that are included in a request, but cannot observe the characteristics of projects that are not included. Specifically, headquarters cannot observe whether a project not included in the request is available to the firm.
The optimal capital allocation system implements the best outcome to shareholders, subject to the information and incentive problems described above. We solve the capital allocation problem as a direct revelation game, where the manager reports the realized state of nature, and headquarters establishes a capital allocation system that maximizes shareholders' value, subject to the incentive compatibility constraint that the manager truthfully reports the realized state. 17 After solving the revelation game, we relate the solution to actual capital allocation systems.
A state of the world is characterized by the realized scale parameter α and the identity of projects that are available to the firm, t∈T = {L, H, LH, φ}. The elements of T represent the availability of project L, 16 If instead the manager's reservation utility were positive, headquarters could motivate the manager by shifting wages between various states without incurring additional costs. Nevertheless, because there are no negative wages, a positive reservation utility would not solve the incentive problems completely. Thus, and in order to simplify the analysis, we assume away this possibility. 17 By the revelation principle, we can solve for the best outcome to shareholders by considering only a direct revelation game.
project H, projects L and H, and no project, respectively. A report r∈R = {α r , t r | α r ∈ℜ + , t r ∈T} consists of the reported α, α r , and the reported projects that are available, t r .
Headquarters problem is to select a probability distribution λ(r) that states the probability that each project will be accepted given a report r, and a wage, W(r), to pay the manager given a report r. The general problem is as follows: Proposition 1 below identifies three capital allocation systems -a centralized capital budgeting system, a performance-based compensation system, and a decentralized capital budgeting system -as the optimal solution to problem (3) through (6), for different parameter values.
Proposition 1

Centralized Capital Budgeting System
There exists g L * < 1 such that, when g L > g L * , the solution to problem (3) - (6) 
Performance-Based Compensation System
When g L < g L * and ( ) 
Decentralized Capital Budgeting System
When g L < g L * and ( ) Proposition 1 states that headquarters determines the capital allocation system depending on the probability of arrival of project L, g L , and the value added from implementing project L (the expected difference between NPV L (α) and NPV H (α)) relative to the expected compensation needed to induce the 18 A proof of these two simplifying substitutions is straightforward and is available from the authors upon manager to reveal project L. The probability g L is important because headquarters' problem is to distinguish between states H and LH, and g L is the arrival probability of project L (state LH), conditional on the arrival of project H.
Part 1 of Proposition 1 states that when g L is relatively high, headquarters establishes a centralized capital allocation system, where it intervenes in the capital allocation process by rejecting project H with probability ) (
whenever the manager reports that only project H is available. The cost of this intervention is the expected loss of the positive NPV of project H when only project H is available and it decreases with g L . The benefit is that when the two projects are available, the manager reports the arrival of project L and headquarters accepts it.
Part 2 of Proposition 1 states that, when g L is relatively small, g L < g * , and the compensation needed to induce the manager to reveal the availability of project L,
small relative to the difference in the projects' expected NPV, ( )
, it is optimal for headquarters to offer the manager a performance-based compensation contract. This compensation gives the manager the incentive to truthfully report the state, enabling headquarters to follow the "textbook" NPV rule whereby it accepts the project with the highest NPV from all reported projects. This policy is represented by an acceptance policy λ H (H) = λ L (LH) = 1. The cost of this performance-based compensation is the expected optimal wage that is paid in state LH. The optimal wage is such that the manager is indifferent between reporting truthfully the arrival of both projects L and H, and reporting only the arrival of project H, i.e., W is such that
The benefit is that when the two projects are available, the manager reports the arrival of project L and headquarters accepts it.
A comparison of the costs and benefits of the two systems in parts 1 and 2 of the proposition reveals that the difference is in the cost structure. As g L increases, the likelihood of state LH increases, implying that request. the expected wage compensation in part 2 increases, while the expected cost of losing the NPV of project H in part 1 decreases. Thus, when g L is high enough, the centralized capital budgeting system dominates the performance-based compensation system. Part 3 of Proposition 1 states that, when g L is relatively small, and the expected compensation needed is relatively high, headquarters' intervention through managerial compensation or project rejection is too costly. Thus, headquarters establishes a decentralized capital budgeting system where it delegates all authority to the manager.
19 This is expressed by W = 0, λ H (H) =1, and λ L (LH) = 0.
Consider now the case where α is unknown to headquarters, that is, the manager observes the realization of the scale parameter α, while headquarters does not. Headquarters can only read the capital budgeting request, so it can only observe the total investment and the total cash flow, but not projects type.
In the cases of centralized and performance-based systems, headquarters needs to disentangle the type of the In the case of a decentralized system, the uncertainty about α is irrelevant since the manager makes the project selection on her own. Thus, the solution to problem (3) through (6) when α is known is also feasible for the case where α is unknown. The only remaining issue is which capital budgeting criteria enable headquarters to extract and use the information in the simplest way. We address this issue in the next section.
Capital budgeting criteria and the implementation of the optimal outcome
So far we have analyzed a revelation game to characterize the optimal capital allocation system. We now analyze the effectiveness of various well-known capital budgeting criteria in implementing the outcome of the optimal capital allocation system. In particular, we compare the effectiveness of ratio criteria like IRR and PI to level criteria like the NPV criterion and capital rationing. All these criteria are simple in that they are applied equally to all projects, regardless of the state of the world. For example, the NPV rule states that projects are accepted if their NPV is positive. In this respect, the NPV criterion sets a universal hurdle of NPV > 0. To the contrary, a state dependent (or complex) rule is a rule that sets different hurdles for different values of α. For example, it may prescribe a hurdle for state α 1 , NPV(α 1 ), and a hurdle for state α 2 , NPV(α 2 ), where NPV(α 1 ) ≠ NPV(α 2 ). In general, if there are no additional costs associated with using more complex state dependent rules, such rules dominate simpler criteria, as they give more flexibility in designing the capital allocation system. If there are additional costs of using more complex rules, the flexibility advantage may be outweighed by the additional costs. In this article we don't address the question of complexity vs. flexibility, but focus on simple capital budgeting criteria that are state independent. That is, we are only interested in the question of whether there is a simple criterion that implements the best outcome.
We first provide the definitions of "textbook" capital budgeting criteria, then assess their effectiveness, and finally offer modified versions of these criteria that dominate their textbook counterpart.
To develop the intuition of why ratio criteria perform better than level criteria and to simplify the analysis, we analyze the case where the functions k I (α) and k c (α) are proportional with proportionality coefficient β, i.e., we assume that
The textbook NPV criterion is to undertake the highest NPV project, as long as it is positive. The textbook IRR criterion is to accept the project with the highest IRR, as long as it exceeds the cost of capital ρ, where the last expression on the right hand side of equation (8) is obtained by substituting
Capital budgeting criteria affect managerial decisions only in the case of a centralized capital budgeting system. We now show that these textbook criteria do not implement the best outcome. Suppose headquarters establishes a centralized system where it accepts the project with the highest positive NPV. The manager will take advantage of this system by requesting project H whenever the project is available. Since the NPV of project H is positive, and it is the only one that the manager requests, headquarters will accept it, leading to an inferior outcome. 20 For the same reason, the textbook IRR and PI ratio also fail to implement the best outcome. This discussion is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2
The textbook NPV, IRR, and PI cannot implement the best outcome.
To implement a better outcome, these textbook criteria can be modified by imposing a stricter standard for accepting projects. For example, headquarters can use a modified NPV criterion that specifies a critical value, NPV c , such that a project is accepted with probability 1 if its NPV is above NPV c . If the requested project has NPV below NPV c , it is accepted with some optimal probability, λ. This rule admits two types of deviations from the outcome of Proposition 1. For high enough realizations of α, the manager can manipulate headquarters to approve project H. This occurs when NPV H (α) > NPV c . When α is low enough, good projects will be rejected. This occurs when NPV L (α) < NPV c . The modified NPV rule is only effective when NPV H (α) > NPV c > NPV L (α), in which case the manager requests project L when both projects are available.
Another criterion that may be used here is capital rationing. Since the manager likes larger-scale projects, capital rationing may force her to report the lower investment project, as follows. Headquarters establishes a critical capital limit, I c , such that, if the requested capital is below I c , the request is warranted, and if the requested capital is above I c , it is warranted with some optimal probability λ. This mechanism has the same two types of disadvantages as the case of the modified NPV criterion, but in a reversed order: when α is high, good projects are rejected with probability 1 -λ, because I m (α) > I c , and when α is low, the manager can manipulate headquarters to accept project H. Thus, this mechanism does not implement the best outcome. Proposition 3 below summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 3
A modified simple NPV criterion and capital rationing cannot implement the best outcome.
Contrary to the NPV criterion, the IRR and PI criteria can be modified to implement the best outcome. The IRR can be modified as follows. If the manager requests a project with IRR = IRR L , headquarters accepts it with probability 1. If she requests a project with IRR = IRR H , headquarters accepts it with probability . The reason why these modifications yield the optimal outcome is that both the IRR and the PI criteria are invariant with α. Therefore, the outcome of part 1 of Proposition 1 can be implemented with these modified simple criteria as in the case of a known α. Proposition 4 summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 4
, the outcome of part 1 of Proposition 1 is implemented using a simple modified PI criterion as follows.
a. If the capital budgeting request includes both projects, the project with PI = PI L is accepted with probability 1.
b.
If the capital budgeting request includes one project, the project with PI = PI L is accepted with probability 1, and the project with PI = PI H is accepted with probability
, the outcome of part 1 of Proposition 1 is implemented using a simple modified IRR criterion as follows.
a.
If the capital budgeting request includes both projects, the project with IRR = IRR L is accepted with probability 1.
b.
If the capital budgeting request includes one project, the project with IRR = IRR L is accepted with probability 1, and the project with IRR = IRR H is accepted with probability
In a performance-based compensation system, headquarters has to pay the manager in state (LH,α) the
. With this wage, the manager is better off reporting the arrival of both projects, than hiding project L and reporting only project H. As before, headquarters can infer α from the report and figure out how much to pay the manager for any realization of α. In terms of investment choice, headquarters follows the textbook NPV rule, where it accepts project L and rejects project H. Proposition 5 describes how a wage compensation combined with the textbook NPV rule implements part 2 of Proposition 1.
Proposition 5
The outcome of part 2 of Proposition 1 is implemented as follows.
a.
If the capital budgeting request consists of both projects, the manager is paid If the capital budgeting request consists of one project, the manager is paid zero and the firm uses the textbook NPV criterion.
Note that the performance-based compensation is not simple in the sense that it depends on the realization of α. Thus, if there are costs for using a complex state dependent compensation rule, a centralized or a decentralized system may dominate the performance-based systems more often.
Implications of the theory
Our theory gives an agency explanation for the use of competing capital budgeting criteria over the NPV criterion. Therefore, in small, manager owned companies, the owner-manager will consider only the NPV rule and her personal preferences when making investment decisions. This is because the NPV rule is the right measure of value added, and the owner-manager has no implementation problem. In contrast, in large corporations, with separation of ownership and control, there are agency problems that lead to implementation problems that require more sophisticated capital allocation systems.
Large corporations with a relatively high likelihood of realizing good investment opportunities (g L is high) will use a centralized capital allocation system that utilizes ratio criteria like the IRR and the PI index and does not have direct linkage between proposed projects and managerial compensation.
Large corporations with relatively low likelihood of realizing good investment opportunities (g L is low) will use the NPV rule, and will link managerial compensation to proposed projects if the extent of the agency problem is not too severe. If the agency problem is severe, it is too expensive to induce the manager to request the high NPV project, and, thus, headquarters delegates the investment decision to the manager.
Our theory can explain the puzzling evidence that most corporations do not rely solely on the NPV rule in their practice of capital budgeting, and, further, that they use the above mentioned "inferior"
competing capital budgeting criteria. Based on a survey of 121 multinational firms in 1981, Stanley and Block (1984) report that "The internal rate of return clearly dominates as the primary method with a 65.3 percent representation. The net present value approach, often preferred over other methods in published materials on the subject, was specified as the primary method in only 16.5 percent of the responses. The payback method was selected as the primary method in only 5 percent of the cases, but was the most important secondary approach in 37.6 percent of the responses." Moreover, they add: "It is interesting to note that the net present value is used less than 50 percent of the times as either a primary or secondary method. " Schall, Sundem, and Geijsbeek (1978) report for a sample of 189 firms that 74% used payback (with only 2% using it as the sole criterion), 58% used accounting rate of return (4% using it alone), 65%
used IRR (6% used it alone), and only 56% used NPV (with only 2% using it alone). Moreover, while 86%
of the firms used either IRR or NPV methods, only 16% used such a technique without also using the payback method or the accounting rate of return method. These reports are consistent with the findings in Mao (1970) , Scott and Petty (1984) , and Ross (1986) .
Another important implication of our theory is that, even if firms use one or more of the known capital budgeting criteria, they are unlikely to use them in their "textbook" forms, but will use modified versions of these criteria. For example, firms will use a modified NPV criterion where they accept projects only if their NPV is above a threshold level different from zero. They may use a modified PI criterion where they set the cutoff for accepting projects at a PI level different than one. Finally, they will employ a modified IRR rule where the hurdle rate is different than the risk-adjusted cost of capital. Thus, our theory can explain the puzzling finding in Poterba and Summers (1995) that U.S. firms use real hurdle rates that are considerably higher than standard cost-of-capital analysis would suggest. Similarly, to the extent that multinational firms investing abroad confront more severe implementation problems, our theory provides a possible rationale for the often criticized practice of adding a fudge factor to the cost of capital used by these firms.
Conclusions
We have shown that there are plausible scenarios where the well-known and often criticized capital budgeting criteria like IRR and PI perform better than the NPV criterion in implementing a value maximizing project selection process. The main lesson of this article is that while NPV is the right statistic to measure the value added to a firm from undertaking a certain project, it does a poor job in implementing a selection process that maximizes firm value. Consequently, NPV is very useful in the valuation of investment projects or companies, but it is much less effective as the core of a capital allocation process. Our theory is consistent with the puzzling evidence that many companies do not use the NPV criterion at all in their capital allocation process, or only rely on it partially.
An interesting common feature of these alternative criteria is that they perform best in the situations where they are in conflict with the NPV rule. We have shown that the IRR and PI criteria are useful in curbing imperialistic managers because they look less favorably on large-scale investments. Another common criticism of the IRR and the Payback criteria is that, in choosing between mutually exclusive projects, they are biased against long-term projects. The intuition we developed in this article suggests that the IRR and the Payback methods may be optimal in situations where managers have personal preferences in favor of long-term projects (e.g., they are risk averse and do not like early resolution of uncertainty about their ability). This may explain why the Payback criterion is widely used in practice, at least as a secondary capital budgeting method.
An important message of the analysis is that in environments that are more complex than the one we have considered, the capital budgeting process may be complex, and, therefore, no simple rule is likely to single-handedly implement the efficient outcome. Rather, a set of rules and restrictions should be put in place. In this respect, the environment we have identified, where a simple criterion can implement the best outcome, is mainly suggestive, and is used to demonstrate the idea that other simple criteria can and do perform better than a simple NPV criterion. We believe that analyses of the capital allocation process in more complex environments will shed light on the rationale behind the elaborate and detailed procedures that various corporations use as part of their capital budgeting process. We hope that in this article we have convinced the reader that the capital allocation process is much more complicated than we have thought and taught our students, and that we have provided a convincing rationale for common practices that seem irrational. After all, scholars of corporate finance who have studied every plausible market imperfection in attempting to explain the determinants of firms' capital structure, should not be surprised that the same principals hold for the capital allocation process. That is, it is not that surprising that the NPV rule, which was derived under strong assumptions of perfect markets, is not followed in practice by companies that operate in imperfect markets. The Sequence of Events and Decisions 
Proof of Proposition 1
We start the proof by rewriting headquarters' constrained optimization problem given by equations (3) through (6), based on the simplifying assumptions and notations discussed prior to Proposition 1 in the text:
We denote by µ 1 the LaGrange multiplier of constraint (A-2), by µ 2 and µ 3 the LaGrange multipliers of the two constraints in (A-3), by µ 4 and µ 5 the LaGrange multipliers of the two constraints in (A-4), and by µ 6 the multiplier of constraint (A-5). To simplify notation, we use λ L for λ L (LH,α), λ H for λ H (H,α), and W for W(LH,α).
The Khun-Tucker conditions of the above problem are:
(A-14)
We first check for possible solutions that satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (A-6) -(A-14) when W > 0, and then we check for possible solutions when W = 0. In addition, at g L = 0, V cent is smaller than both V comp and V dec , and at g L = 1, it is larger than both V comp and V dec . Therefore, there exists a unique g L * as in part 1 of the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Propositions 2 -5
See detailed discussion prior to the propositions.
